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Article 9

SUFFERING THE
MODERNIST
LEGACY OF
HUSSERLIAN
PHENOMENOLOGY
James J. Hodge
Testing the Limit: Derrida, Levinas,
Henry, and the Phenomenological
Tradition by François-David
Sebbah. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2012. Pp. 336.
$90.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.

Phenomenology has received a
curiously spotty reception in the
wake of the influx of Continental
philosophy in language departments in North America beginning
in the 1960s. Of the three major
philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, Martin Heidegger
remains the most widely read, yet
he is also regularly discussed as
though somehow beyond the context of phenomenology. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s death in 1961
deprived him of the opportunity
to engage the emerging AngloAmerican appetite for French
theory in person and in “the flesh.”
More significantly, it denied him
the chance of responding to the
casual statements levied against
phenomenology in the works of
Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault,
and other stars of the ’68 generation. And although his voluminous
and antiseptic prose has undoubtedly turned off many potential
readers, Edmund Husserl’s legacy has suffered from the errant
impression that Jacques Derrida’s
most famous works from 1967—
including Of Grammatology and
especially Voice and Phenomenon—
constitute something of a summary rejection of Husserl’s project
insofar as it represents the grand
villain of the “metaphysics of presence.” Husserl’s reputation—again,
within language departments and
not necessarily philosophy departments—has suffered in inverse
correlation with Derrida’s status
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as perhaps the most influential and
famous avatar of so-called “French
theory.” This situation has always
been quite unfair to Husserl and
phenomenology more generally.
With the rise of interest in the
body, embodiment, and affect
in the last two decades or so, the
situation has started to change.
Phenomenology has begun to
achieve more critical currency.
Merleau-Ponty’s work has proven
particularly important for the work
of several influential scholars in the
fields of film studies and new media
studies. Beyond the work of Vivian
Sobchack and Mark B. N. Hansen,
however, the word phenomenology
has largely become disconnected
from its philosophical origins.1 Use
of the word phenomenological as
a synonym for embodied experience constitutes merely the most
egregious symptom of this condition. Discussion of Husserl’s work,
it almost goes without saying,
remains marginal at best, and the
very meaning of phenomenology
remains unproductively elusive.
Although it is not aimed at correcting these problems of North
American literary and media studies, Stephen Barker’s translation
of François-David Sebbah’s 2001
monograph Testing the Limit offers
a potent resource for those interested in not only phenomenology
but in understanding its legacy
for several important continental
philosophers. The specific achievement of Sebbah’s text lies with his

careful and revealing readings
of Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel
Levinas, Michel Henry, and JeanLuc Marion among a group of
French philosophers whose concern with issues of givenness, time,
and subjectivity all ultimately
derive from Husserl and thus
share a certain family resemblance.
Sebbah refers to these philosophers
as phenomenologists, a key decision no doubt meant to provoke.
It is no surprise to discuss Henry
or Marion as phenomenologists,
but eyebrows might be raised with
respect to Derrida and Levinas.
Even though Levinas studied with
both Husserl and Heidegger in
Freiburg, and Derrida spent the
first decade of his career writing
about Husserl, both thinkers are
generally thought of as breaking
with phenomenology in order to
establish their own philosophical
projects. Carefully avoiding the
politics of labeling philosophers as
phenomenologists with a capital P,
Sebbah admirably explores their
work as operating within the longer tradition of phenomenology
in a refreshingly nonpartisan and
nongenerationalist manner.
Sebbah synthesizes the work
of these often very different philosophers by devoting himself to
specifying how each operates at
the extreme limits of Husserlian
phenomenology. To pursue this
project, Sebbah explicitly suspends
consideration of phenomenology’s
more recent theological turn (and
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silently suspends analysis of similarly contemporary efforts to naturalize phenomenology in concert
with research in cognitive science and neuroscience).2 At least
in the North American context,
the impact of this decision registers beyond the already significant
but ultimately highly specialized
payoff associated with the astute
reconsideration of the rich work
of individual philosophers. More
broadly, Sebbah’s work productively opens up the question of the
phenomenological tradition as part
of a larger question of historicizing phenomenology and its heirs
within a modernist tradition.
Phenomenology
properly
emerges with Husserl in the early
twentieth century. As Husserl and
many other practitioners observe,
phenomenology is not so much a
school of philosophy as a method
for the investigation into phenomena and their fundamentally partial appearance to consciousness or,
as Husserl puts it, perception by
adumbration. The suspension or
bracketing of empirical reality—
what is generally known as the
universal epoché—constitutes the
distinctive methodological operation of Husserlian phenomenology.
The meaning, extent, and dubious
success of the epoché, then, represent
one of the most significant themes
in the phenomenological tradition.
Many writers might be content to
cast judgment on Husserl’s philosophical project accordingly. To his
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great credit, Sebbah reads Derrida,
Levinas, and Henry as not breaking with Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of its success or
failure, but continually dwelling at
the extreme limits of the phenomenological enterprise in the aporia
of phenomenality and nongivenness as the “very matrix of all aporia” composing phenomenology as
“less a field of problems than a field
of aporias” that also includes time
and subjectivity (245, 244). It is this
shared sense of a common modus
operandi among Derrida, Levinas,
and Henry that inspires the richly
suggestive title of Sebbah’s study:
L’épreuve de la limite. Translated
into English as Testing the Limit,
Sebbah’s use of the term épreuve
taps into its polyvalence as meaning
a test, an experience, and suffering.
Each meaning of the term suggests
a slightly different dimension of
Sebbah’s project. On the one hand,
he indicates that Derrida, Levinas,
and Henry all put the limits of phenomenology to the test, so to speak.
But further, their writings also constitute a continual w
 orking-through
of the fundamentally irresolvable
aporias that preoccupy phenomenological investigation—especially
the aforementioned issues of givenness, time, and subjectivity. These
writers experience the limit in their
own writing and we with them.
Finally, as Sebbah reflects, the experience of reading Derrida, Levinas,
and Henry—as many readers may
agree with a knowing wink—can

158

James J. Hodge

be somewhat traumatic. The frequently opaque, nonlogical—
which is not to say illogical—and
literary quality of their writings
expresses the ordeal of testing the
limits of phenomenology. And it is
this observation, perhaps more than
any other sustained analysis in the
book, that opens up Sebbah’s project to wider stakes.
Here it becomes helpful to
recall Martin Jay’s astute placement
of phenomenology in the wider
historical field of modernism.
Modernism, of course, is and has
been many things, yet one particularly dominant characterization of
its spirit concerns what Jay, citing
Renato Poggioli, calls its “mystique
of purity.”3 Instanced by the incessant theoretical and practical concern of many artists and critics alike
to determine the unique characteristics of art forms such as painting, cinema, and literature—for
example, Wassily Kandinsky, Hans
Richter, and Gertrude Stein and
Clement Greenberg, André Bazin,
and the New Critics—this drive
similarly informs phenomenology
as, first and foremost, a discourse
founded against what philosophers
of the day termed psychologism, or
the tendency to reduce the mind
to the psyche in such a way that
obscures the apodictic nature of
logic and mathematics in a shroud
of crude relativism. While it is
impossible to rehearse the problem
of psychologism here, it suffices
to say that the Husserlian epoché

constitutes a classically modernist
methodological attempt to suspend
every contaminating influence
from the outside world that might
obfuscate knowledge of the things
themselves. The modernist drive
to isolate, suspend, and purify lies
behind both the power and the limits of Husserlian phenomenology.
And it is precisely these limits to
which Sebbah attends both in his
method and his critical readings. It
is perhaps instructive to remember
this larger context of modernism in
reading Sebbah’s claim about his
own methodology. He writes that
it is not his goal to “ask questions
of a text, but rather to think within
a text, to take it as a medium allowing for the possibility of a thought
that no other has ever made or will
ever make possible” (11). One finds
here some of the core ideas of the
modernist drive so briefly sketched
earlier, including a certain hermeticism poised against the possibility of mixing or comparing, as
well as something of a background
notion of medium specificity. No
doubt Sebbah does not intend to
invoke Clement Greenberg, yet
viewed alongside modernism one
detects the remarkable notion of
Husserlian phenomenology as
a philosophical medium always
straining to stave off the influence
of the mixed media of empirical
reality.
Sebbah’s lucid, always probing
analyses of his subjects likewise
reveal further connection with
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phenomenology’s heritage in the
writings of mid- and late-twentyfirst-century French philosophers.
It is difficult to miss the influence
of modernism at certain moments,
as when Sebbah cites Levinas’s
idea that to listen to music is to
resist dance (as though confronting one artistic genre necessitates
the suspension of another). At
other moments, the generative
confluence of phenomenology,
modernism, and literary analysis
reveals a deeper affinity. Sebbah’s
analyses of Levinas and Derrida
on literary works by Edgar Allan
Poe and James Joyce here prove
remarkable. As Sebbah writes,
Levinas’s discussion of the fear of
being interred alive in Poe’s “Cask
of Amontillado” (1846) starkly
illustrates the broader themes of
alterity at the root of givenness
and subjectivity, or the “horror of
being” (144). This citation vividly
aligns Levinas’s philosophical project and an early master of modern
American literature with Sebbah’s
own stated methodological injunction to dwell within the medium of
a text to its limit. Sebbah’s emphasis of Derrida’s reading of the circulation of breath in Ulysses (1922)
similarly aligns modernist literature with the investigation of core
problems of subjectivity. More
broadly, the payoff, for Sebbah,
of reading Derrida as a phenomenologist lies at least in part with
the way such a view reorients our
understanding of deconstruction as
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expressing both “the impossibility
of the phenomenological reduction
and the impossibility of not desiring the reduction” (56). The wider
payoff may be to historicize deconstruction in terms of the longer
phenomenological and modernist
inheritance of its singular preference for articulating the aporias of
language—that is, of the very limits
of language.
Sebbah’s affinity for the aporias
of thought finally, and productively, ends on the issue of rhythm.
Dwelling with the medium of phenomenological thought provides its
own ongoing reward, rhetorically
invoked with the frequent mentions of mise en abyme and the
flicker of givenness and nongivenness. “Rhythm,” Sebbah writes,
“ceaselessly awakens phenomenality” (200). Such rhythm can be scrutinized only within the limits of
phenomenological investigation. If
phenomenology constitutes a kind
of modernist formalism, then it is
also of an unusually restless variety
that resists schematic thinking—
indeed, that resists ending, solidity, or firm labels for concepts that
will always require testing and
retesting. And, as Sebbah’s insightful book demonstrates, perhaps the
only way to gain insight into such
a restless rhythm is to participate
within it oneself, to join one’s thought
to an ongoing test of a method
that seeks to block everything out
but the thing itself. Some have
scoffed at the supposedly idealist
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fruitlessness of such an endeavor,
but, as Sebbah’s book attests, so
much can be gained by exploring
its limits, as well as the modernist
drive that informs its practice.
James J. Hodge is assistant professor of
English and Humanities at Northwestern
University. Specializing in comparative
digital media aesthetics, his essays have been
published in Critical Inquiry, Postmodern
Culture, and Film Criticism.
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